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PRIVATE POWER AND THE CONSTITUTION
John H. Garvey*
The papers in this symposium deal with two large subjects.
The first is the breakdown of the public/private distinction. The
second is the problems caused by this breakdown.
I
I will speak first about the breakdown of the public/private
distinction. The legal name for it is the state action problem. This
is such a common term that we sometimes forget that it is actually a
phrase-a compound of two nouns ('state' and 'action'), like bank
holiday, or dance card, or dog pound. I draw attention to this fact
because we have difficulties with both parts of the phrase. Some of
our problems center about the meaning of the word 'state.' Others
concern the word 'action.'
I will begin with the word 'state.' The term appears in § 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and it seems to refer to places like Ne-
braska and Utah. We also use the word to refer to nation-states,
like the United States of America. But what exactly do we mean
when we say that the state has acted? Suppose Nebraska passes a
law abolishing the tort of defamation for public figures. (This gives
speakers more protection than the First Amendment, which only
abolishes defamation without malice.) And suppose now that the
Omaha police chief arrests me for saying things about him that are
nasty but true. Or suppose that a state trial court awards the chief
damages for what I said. Who represents Nebraska in these hy-
potheticals-the legislature, or the police and the court?
There are two good reasons for saying that the real state action
is the action of the legislature. One is that state law makes the legis-
lature the supreme authority on most questions. The police chief
and the court are acting illegally under Nebraska law. If we give
Nebraska's legal system a chance to work it will ultimately repudi-
ate their actions.
The other reason to focus on the action of the legislature is that
the Constitution seems to require it. The First Amendment says
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that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech." It is addressed to Congress, not the President or the
courts. And it forbids lawmaking (the sort of thing legislatures do),
not arrests or trials. If we extend this prohibition to the states (by
incorporation), we should probably observe a comparable limitation
there.
As you know, this is the place where the state action limitation
first broke down. In 1913 the Supreme Court held that state action
was not limited to lawmaking; it included all kinds of acts by gov-
ernment officials, even those that violated state law.1 About fifty
years later the Court held that the federal courts had not only con-
stitutional but also statutory authority to deal with such acts. That
is the meaning of Monroe v. Pape,2 which lets people sue for lawless
official action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It now accounts for a large
percentage of the business of the federal courts.3 Richard Kay ar-
gues that the first of these decisions was a mistake-that the Consti-
tution should limit only acts of lawmaking (and official action
carrying out contestable laws).4
I said that the idea of state action has been expanded along two
axes. One is the meaning of the word 'state.' The other is the
meaning of the word 'action.' Here I want to mention two influen-
tial theories for stretching in this direction. There are more, and
these two may actually collapse into one, but for our purposes I will
focus on just these two and treat them separately.
The first theory argues that the idea of state action also encom-
passes state inaction: sometimes we can hold the state responsible
when it appears to be doing nothing. I will call this the permission
theory. It reminds me of scholastic brain-teasers about the omnipo-
tence of God. If God is omnipotent, how can we explain the pres-
ence of evil in the world? What makes the question hard is the
implicit assumption that God is morally responsible for allowing
things to happen that he has the power to prevent. According to
the permission theory the state is like God. It is practically om-
nipotent; there are very few things it can't forbid. To take an obvi-
ous example, it could (if it wanted to) outlaw most kinds of private
discrimination. If it fails to do this, it is morally responsible when
1. Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913).
2. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
3. Peter W. Low & John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Civil Rights Actions 16 & note g (Founda-
tion Press, 1988).
4. Richard S. Kay, The State Action Doctrine, The Public-Private Distinction, and the
Independence of Constitutional Law, 10 Const. Comm. 331, 344-51 (1993). Kay includes in
the category 'lawmaking' not only statutes, but also common law-making by courts and exec-
utive law-making in areas where the Constitution gives the executive (the President or com-
parable state officials) that authority.
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bad things happen. Consider also the case of Joshua DeShaney.5
He lived with his father after his parents divorced, and over a pe-
riod of four years his father beat him senseless. The Wisconsin so-
cial welfare bureaucracy observed all this going on but did nothing
to stop it-though it had ample legal power to do so. It is morally
responsible for permitting this brutality to go on, like Kitty Geno-
vese's neighbors, or like God.
You will see a discussion of the permission theory in several of
the papers in this symposium. Larry Alexander and Michael Seid-
man find it persuasive.6 Richard Kay argues against the permission
theory. He thinks that we can distinguish between actions and
omissions. (We do it all the time in criminal law and torts.) And he
says that we should not hold the state responsible for the mere fail-
ure to act.7
The permission theory holds that we have state action when
the state sits idly by and lets bad things happen. The second theory
argues that the state is actively involved in (almost) all private ac-
tion, but at such a deep level that we tend to overlook it. I will call
this (sticking with my theological metaphors) the prime mover the-
ory. Consider again the case of Joshua DeShaney. We think it
rather natural that he was living with his father. But that was in
fact the result of a state court decision awarding the father custody
after a divorce. The first cause of Joshua's predicament was the
state, which delivered him up to a brutal custodian.8 Or consider
the case of Flagg Brothers v. Brooks.9 The question was whether
there was state action when a warehouseman engaged in self-help
and sold a bailor's goods to cover his charges. Such a sale could
only take place in a legal system with property and contract rules.
In New York, where this case happened, those rules allowed Flagg
Brothers to pass good title and prevented Brooks from interfering
with the sale.lo You will see the prime mover theory discussed also
in several of these papers-Kay's and Seidman's in particular.
To recapitulate very briefly: the border between private action
5. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
6. Larry Alexander, The Public/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on Pri-
vate Power, 10 Const. Comm. 363 (1993); Louis M. Seidman, The State Action Paradox, 10
Const. Comm. 381 (1993).
7. Kay, 10 Const. Comm. at 348-60 (cited in note 4).
8. Seidman, 10 Const. Comm. at 389 (cited in note 6).
9. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
10. Alexander, 10 Const. Comm. at 365-66 (cited in note 6). Brooks also relied on the
permission theory, because New York had a law (Uniform Commercial Code § 7-210) al-
lowing a warehouseman to satisfy a lien on goods in his possession by selling the goods. The
Court rejected this argument. It held that § 7-210 merely embodied (in statutory form) the
state's decision not to act, and states were not responsible for inaction.
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and public (state) action is no longer a clear one, because state ac-
tion has spread out so far in two directions. First, the idea of the
'state' is larger than it used to be. It includes not just lawmakers
but all public officials, even ones who are acting lawlessly. Second,
the meaning of the word 'action' has also been enlarged. It can
include inaction as well (the permission theory), because the state
may be responsible for failing to prevent harm. And it is present in
the background of every case (the prime mover theory) where pri-
vate actors rely on the legal system to order their affairs.
II
I now want to say a few words about the problems caused by
the breakdown of the public/private distinction. These papers sug-
gest three such problems, though whether they actually are
problems, and whether these costs outweigh the benefits of abolish-
ing the distinction, are disputed questions.
The first problem is that there is an economy of restraint, and
the breakdown makes the Constitution a less effective restraint on
government. Those who make this argument begin with the as-
sumption that the power of the government is qualitatively different
from the power of any other social institution: it is "the only actor
not subject to regulation by ordinary law."11 All the other (private)
centers of power-defense contractors, public utilities, pension
funds, churches, Madison Avenue-are (putting the Constitution to
one side for a moment) subordinate to the lawmaking power of the
state. The Constitution thus performs the special function of pro-
viding "a law for the lawmaker."12
Now it is a fact well known to football fans that if you string
your defense out along the line of scrimmage you open yourself up
to runs up the middle, where you have no depth. A defense only
has eleven players, and it's important to position them so as to get
the maximum effect. The more ground you try to cover, the less
protection you will get within the covered area. People sometimes
make this argument about the scope of rights protected by the Con-
stitution. If we apply the same rules to advertising and pornogra-
phy as we do to political speech, there is a danger that we will
weaken the freedom of speech in cases where it really matters. 13 If
we extend the freedom of religion to cover all claims of conscience,
11. Kay, 10 Const. Comm. at 354 (cited in note 4).
12. Id. at 355.
13. John H. Garvey & Frederick Schauer, The First Amendment: A Reader 148 (West
Pub. Co., 1992); Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265 (1981).
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we will get so many requests for exemptions that the laws will be-
come unenforceable. Then the only way to prevent anarchy will be
to weaken the protection of the Free Exercise Clause-to say that it
is subordinate to the everyday concerns of government. The safer
thing to do in each case is to put more protection in the middle (use
linebackers and a secondary) so you can stop the plays that really
matter.
We can make the same kind of argument about the public/
private distinction. The more actors the Constitution has to defend
us against, the less protection it will give us in cases that really mat-
ter. If the same rules that cover the state of Nebraska are applied to
the Garvey family and the Home Dairy, we will have to start weigh-
ing interests and making exceptions. Or to put it in legal jargon, we
will have to engage in a lot of ad hoc balancing. The end result will
be that we get less protection where we really need it. Better to
limit private power by passing laws, and save the Constitution to
check the lawmakers.
Richard Kay relies on the economy of restraint as a reason for
saving the public/private distinction.14 Larry Alexander disagrees.
He argues that if we look hard enough we will find state action in
every case. But this does not mean that the Constitution requires
families, farms and pension funds to behave as Nebraska must.
There are special reasons for allowing private choices-even choices
that states themselves could not make-and these will often tip the
balance against regulation.15 Implicit in Alexander's argument is
the assumption (which Kay disputes) that courts can do this kind of
balancing without jeopardizing the rule of law.
Let me turn now to a second problem caused by the break-
down of the public/private distinction, which I will call the threat
to private rights. There are always two parties in state action cases,
and we are tempted to invoke the Constitution because one of them
is a bad guy. Randy, let us say, is mistreating Jane. If we can show
that Randy is a public actor, we can apply the Due Process Clause
to their relationship and right this wrong. But we may catch Jane
in the same net we throw over Randy.
Suppose that she is Jane Roe. The right to make choices about
reproduction assumes that there is a public/private distinction; we
call the right a right of privacy. Roe v. Wade holds that "there is a
sphere of privacy within which each woman has a right [free from
state interference] to decide for herself whether she ought to have
14. Kay, 10 Const. Comm. at 341-43 (cited in note 4).
15. Alexander, 10 Const. Comm. at 367-68, 374 (cited in note 6).
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an abortion."16 But if there is no sphere of privacy for Randy, there
will be none for Jane either. As Michael Seidman shows, we could
make the same arguments for finding the state behind Jane's actions
as we would for Randy: the state determined her choice by refusing
to provide health benefits for pregnant mothers and child services
for new infants.17
We could extend this point in various directions. Many people
argue that the foundation of free speech is the individual interest in
self-rule or self-expression.18 These ideas, like the right of privacy,
make no sense unless there is a private realm within which a person
can make her own choices and determine the direction of her own
life. If everything we think and do is state action, the freedom of
speech rests on an illusion.
Or, to take another example, consider the case of religious free-
dom. Law schools usually teach that religion is a private matter.
The Establishment Clause is designed to keep it out of public life;
the Free Exercise Clause protects it within the private sphere. But
if everything is public there is no work for the Free Exercise Clause
to do; indeed, it may even be that the Establishment Clause applies
to the affairs of the Catholic Church.
This is a high price to pay to keep Randy from abusing Jane.
Akhil Amar proposes a lower-cost solution. He argues that some
private actions, like child abuse, are forbidden by the Thirteenth
Amendment.19 This solution does not deny that there are private
actions. Nor does it deny that many of them are beyond the reach
of the Constitution. It only says that some parts of the Constitution
apply directly to private behavior (a point no one disputes), and
then makes a (more controversial) claim about what types of behav-
ior are covered.
Let me turn now to the last of the problems associated with the
breakdown of the public/private distinction. I will call this an ideo-
logical problem, for reasons that I think will be obvious. For the
first decade after Brown v. Board of Education, before Congress got
involved by enacting the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the courts were the
only place plaintiffs could go to enforce the principle of racial equal-
16. Seidman, 10 Const. Comm. at 395 (cited in note 6).
17. Id. at 395-96.
18. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 964 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591 (1982);
David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory of the First
Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1974).
19. Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 Const. Comm. 405 (1993); see also
Akhil Reed Amar and Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment
Response to DeShaney, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1359 (1992).
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ity. And in the absence of federal statutory commands the only
justification for interfering in state affairs was proof that existing
social practices violated the Equal Protection Clause. The state and
federal legislatures were not just idle, but institutionally incapable
of acting. State legislatures in the south (and the north) were
malapportioned and constituted in a way that represented the ex-
isting segregated social structure. Congress's own internal prac-
tices, in particular the committee structure and the filibuster,
inhibited it from passing laws to deal with voting, housing, schools,
employment, public accommodations, and so forth. So it is no sur-
prise that the classical texts on the problem of state action are cases
dealing with race relations: Shelley v. Kraemer,20 the Girard College
Case,21 Evans v. Newton,22 and Evans v. Abney,23 Burton v. Wil-
mington Parking Authority,24 Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvi,25 Reit-
man v. Mulkey,26 and the White Primary Cases.27 Given these
circumstances it is no wonder that, as David Strauss says, the state
action doctrine was seen as "the enemy."28 The federal courts were
on the side of the angels, and any legal barrier that kept them from
getting involved in the cause of reform had to be knocked down.
Today, Strauss argues, there may be better ways of solving the
kinds of problems he is concerned about: hate speech and pornogra-
phy, affirmative action, election finance, integration maintenance.
It is not always clear which side of these problems the good guys are
on. We need to experiment with different solutions. But constitu-
tional remedies, which are what the courts give us, are by nature
uniform and inflexible. Legislative solutions, on the other hand, can
be different in different jurisdictions, and tailored to fit the shape of
the body politic. What's more, Strauss asserts, we are more likely
to get action out of our legislatures on these issues, because they are
no longer immobilized by the kind of institutional gridlock that we
had in the era of Jim Crow. For purposes of our discussion, this
means that we should not strain to find state action at every turn. It
20. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
21. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957). See also
Pennsylvania v. Brown, 392 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 921 (1968).
22. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
23. 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
24. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
25. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
26. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
27. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932);
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
28. David Strauss, State Action After the Civil Rights Era, 10 Const. Comm. 413, 418
(1993).
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will be all right, indeed it may be better, if we preserve some rem-
nant of the public/private distinction.
I have called this problem ideological because it puts the pub-
lic/private distinction at the service of political goals. For Strauss
the state action doctrine seems not to have any independent signifi-
cance. We should find state action, or not, depending on which
answer will better serve the ends of justice.
Edwin Baker has given us a wonderful illustration of how legis-
lative solutions (the kind Strauss prefers) can advance constitutional
ends in the post-civil rights era.29 Baker argues that the most po-
tent and pernicious censor of content in the media today is not the
government but advertisers. One way to deal with this problem
would be to show that commercial censorship was not private but
public action, and let the courts impose First Amendment restric-
tions. Baker takes a more Straussian approach. He concedes that
advertisers exercise private power, and argues for a legislative solu-
tion. He proposes a tax on advertising and a subsidy for readers-a
remedy that the courts would be institutionally incapable of
providing.
If I may recapitulate once more: we hear today three kinds of
reasons for preserving the public/private distinction. One (the
economy of restraint) is that we need it to make the Constitution an
effective restraint on government. A second (the threat to private
rights) is that we cannot control bad private actors without also
controlling good ones. If we abolish the notion of privacy to get at
child abuse, we may also break down the barrier that protects re-
productive freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so
on. Third (the ideological problem), those who want to abolish the
public/private distinction for political reasons-to let progressive
courts solve social problems-may find that they can get better re-
lief for today's problems from other branches of government. I
should add that there is considerable disagreement about these so-
called problems: many find them untroubling, or even incoherent.
But the papers in this symposium offer a much-needed discussion of
all these issues.
29. C. Edwin Baker, Private Power, the Press, and the Constitution, 10 Const. Comm.
425 (1993); see also C. Edwin Baker, Advertising and a Democratic Press, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev.
2097 (1992).
